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History and Justice:  
Is Time “Equitable” and History “the All-seeing Eye of Justice”? 
 
History does not provide justice but contributes to consolidating the concept and value 
of justice, to the reinforcement of social justice: it refines it as a concept, extends its 
content, studies it through the different social situations of each era, records its 
readjustments and establishes the notion that social justice is a concept and a value 
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that should be constantly examined and readjusted to social developments. It is 
necessary to apply such claims to what will be examined below as they are connected 
with basic issues of epistemological, methodological and ethico-political nature.  
 
More specifically, these claims are the necessary conceptual differentiations since 
they concern the delicate and complex relationship between the discipline of history 
and the universal value of justice. Judicial practices, the processes of justice 
administration, the allocation of responsibilities, accounting for sentences for 
committed (and therefore past, controversial and traumatic) actions, all intertwine and 
shape the complex and fragile relationship between history and justice. When this 
relationship becomes dense and impenetrable, then historiography declines towards 
morality, swinging its vengeance sword of peoples and losers, according to 
Chateaubriand’s famous statement.  
 
It is widely accepted that in a globalized world the topic of historical justice ought to 
be taken into consideration within a multidimensional framework and through a 
global perspective. As Jan Löfström ascertains, “the turn of the third Millennium has 
been characterized as the age of apology, due to the increased audibility of demands 
and offers of institutional reparations and acts of redress”.1 According to Löfström, 
“the topic is most interesting to study, since it provides a view onto some important 
aspects of citizens’ historical consciousness”.2 Jörn Rüsen suggests that “there is 
always a moral or an ethical element involved in historical consciousness”.3 For this 
reason, we are obliged to give more space and include the politico-ideological and 
also the moral dimensions of history in the subject’s curricula; mainly the 
historization of public memories. Also, in many European countries remembrance 
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education has been made an official part of the history curriculum or of the cross-
curricular aims and objectives of secondary education (Belgium is an indicative case). 
The term “remembrance education” refers to the recognition of the responsibility “for 
crimes or suffering caused in the past” and also the knowledge about the “dark 
chapters” of the humanity in order “to prevent recurrence or denial” of these 
“devastating events” or to demonstrate our duty as citizens to fight against 
intolerance, discriminations, racism, xenophobia and human rights violation”.4  
Generally, the debt of memory, the concern for doing justice to the dead and the 
struggle to exit the vicious circle of History, provide the fertile ground for the 
relationship between historical truth and historical justice to grow.  
 
While historical science is still obliged to understand and explain, it does not mean to 
administer justice retroactively, transform its methodological tools and its conceptual 
categories into Procrustean devices saturated with the rationale of criminal law 
(victimizer/ victim, guilty/ innocent, instigator and moral instigator, responsibility/ 
punishment/ dismissal...). Neither does it mean to sink into relativism. Even though 
the conceptual worlds of the past and present are different, one could accept the 
possibility of a rational and critical account of the values of the past.
5
 Also, the 
historian is not a head-hunter, an expert, a witness or a judge. Some historians 
undertake such roles, such as Daniel Goldhagen, who seems convinced of the German 
people’s collective guilt for the Nazi crimes and atrocities;6 or Stéphane Courtois, 
who supported the establishment of an international court of law for the moral, 
ideological and political conviction of communism.
7
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The issue of historical justice emerged dynamically after the fall of the dictatorships 
in Latin America, the collapse of real socialism and the end of the Apartheid regime 
in South Africa.
8
 However, it first appeared and was established in the western 
collective imaginary after the Holocaust and Nazism’s painful memories. As a result, 
the Nuremberg trials epitomized legal civilization. Firstly, they shifted the framework 
of justice administration to the international scene and the collective guilt burden 
towards allocating individual responsibilities; secondly, international corps of judges 
were formed for the legal proceedings of the cases; and thirdly, the moral conviction 
of the past created a legal framework that focused on crimes against humanity and 
their retroactive criminalization outside national borders.
9
  
 
This type of legal and symbolic restoration of injustice of the past, which in essence 
provides only public visibility and recognition to the victims and incorporates their 
experiences in the official national narrative, cannot be beneficial.  Especially, if 
applied in a society where the ex-victimizers were re-incorporated functionally, that 
is, in key positions in the state or power hierarchy, thus becoming immune to 
punishment against their actions in the past (see France and Germany, e.g. Kiesinger, 
Globke, Papon). Moreover, such application of justice becomes ineffective when the 
covered up actions of the victimizers are exclusively ascribed to the power 
mechanisms of totalitarian regimes or the conformism of societies, invalidating 
entirely the dimension of individual pathology or individual responsibility, free will 
and the potential for resistance.
10
            
 
 
Administering Historical Justice I: The Advocacy of Claudia Eppert  
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According to Claudia Eppert, administering historical justice ought to be the 
historians’ fundamental value and essential purpose: it is the historian’s duty to 
examine, resolve and “restore” an injustice, moral or material, caused to an individual, 
a social or ethnic group, a nation, a people or an entire civilization in the past.
11
 She 
believes that moral restoration is possible when, firstly, the testimonies and the 
primary experience that a prisoner of the past has, are torn open; and secondly, the 
conditions which could allow such negative experience to re-occur in the present and 
the future are eradicated.  
 
Eppert refers to Walter Benjamin and Abraham Heschel, in an attempt to articulate 
memory “ethics” and memory “pedagogy”. Her point of view is based on the moral 
statement that recalling the memory of the forgotten ones and the losers, who anyway 
have exceptional, unique and usually non-comparable experiences, is aiming, not at 
retroactively vindicating them, but at enriching the experience of the people in the 
present, who learn to remember, in order not to repeat similar suffering. However, 
such approach hardly avoids historical moralization, as it presumes the presence of an 
exemplary historical consciousness, which deals with historical knowledge as a 
suffering prevention mechanism that can break the vicious circle of negative 
experiences.  
 
Administering Historical Justice II:  
The Objections of Henry Rousso and Carlo Ginzburg  
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One counterexample is the one of Henry Rousso who denied participating as an 
expert in Papon’s trial. He justified his attitude by emphasizing the complexity of the 
relationship between the institution of justice and national memory and identity, 
between the dominant ideology and historical consciousness, let alone historical 
science. Hence, he put forward the argument that, contrary to expressing a final 
verdict implied in every judicial practice (even retroactively), the sole aim of 
historical science is the Sisyphean effort to approach the truth, which is always de 
facto relative.
12
  
 
The second counterexample is Carlo Ginzburg and the views he expressed during the 
Sofri trial in Italy.
13
 The Italian historian also juxtaposed judicial and historical truth, 
even though these two types of truth are only possible when related to various and 
sometimes, contradictory evidence, proof and verifying rationales. He supported that 
judicial truth is characterized by uniqueness, necessity/ inevitability, inflexibility and 
canonization. These could partly contravene the relativity, the partiality, the 
fragmentation, the revisability and the non-normativeness of historical truth, which 
the internally multilateral and multidimensional community of historians accepts at 
every particular historical situation and within the framework of defined 
historiographical rationales and epistemological examples.
14
  
 
Historical Justice: Its Three Types According to Social and Political Theory 
 
Historical justice demands the “investigation of the truth” about the “dark pages” of 
History, or its signifying silence. When power relations and the ideological hegemony 
favour the result of this investigation, it leads to the readjustment or the internal 
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subversion of historical standards as well as the replacement or re-arranging of the 
national narrative. As a result, it becomes the beneficial framework for either national 
reconciliation or overcoming hostility between states.
15
 Modern social and political 
theory distinguishes three types of historical justice:  
 
a) Retributive justice, such as the Nuremberg Trials, the legislation about Historical 
Memory (France, Poland) or the trials at a national or international level for cleansing 
the traumatic and controversial past (high treason, collaboration with the enemy), as 
well as sentencing the ones found guilty for war crimes or crimes against humanity 
and the symbolic, moral and/or economical restoration and compensation of the 
victims. In these cases, the legal initiatives taken by victims’ groups and institutions 
or by international organizations, or even (rarely) the states themselves, are inversely 
proportional to the victims’ will to recognize their responsibilities and their guilt.  
However, the failure to punish the victimizers creates a feeling of collective 
responsibility and guilt, which destroys the institutions of justice, bringing about a 
crisis in the legality of political power.
16
  
 
It is estimated that during the first post-war decade and within the Nazi cleansing 
framework, many millions of people, and more specifically, a percentage of 2-3% of 
the population of the states that found themselves under German occupation, were 
dislocated and punished all over the European continent. Another distinctive category 
of defendants that was subjected to the exemplary punishment of the winners was the 
category of academics, artists and journalists, who were arrested because they had 
provided the enemy with “valuable” services.  
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The main objection against retributive historical justice is its retroactive nature, 
considering that when such crimes were committed, there was not any relevant active 
law (nulla poena sine lege). In some occasions, this objection is handled technically 
(and therefore remains fightable) by restricting the committed crimes in legal 
categories created just for them. These categories either potentially correspond to the 
legal regime of the trial period, or, as the actions they describe, collide with and 
therefore contravene the universal map of absolute human rights, leading to their 
persecution and punishment, even retroactively, since ethics are considered to surpass 
the law.   
 
b) Reparative / restorative justice, which was established internationally by the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and does not retroactively bring forward criminal charges about 
the atrocious activities of the past.
17
 On the contrary, it consists of purposely-
structured truth and reconciliation commissions aiming at: 
- Firstly, reassuring the human nature of the victimizer (individual or group) after 
accepting responsibility or guilt and therefore their social rehabilitation; 
- Secondly, creating a culture of dialogue to bridge the opposites and promote active 
tolerance and understanding between historical opponents, their successful co-
existence, the decrease of the psychological chasm between victims and victimizers 
and the restoration of bonds, either within fragmented societies where fragmented 
memories dominate, or between states, whose relations continue to be governed by 
the pain of unhealed traumas; 
- Thirdly, moral and material restoration/compensation of the victims, based on the 
atonement of the victimizers and at the same time, the recognition of the victims’ 
suffering or the unappreciated historical role they played. 
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Thus, reparative/restorative justice can be either financial or moral, that is, a 
symbolical restoration of defamation, humiliation, injustice or violence the victim 
suffered. It initially includes the public confession of crimes against humanity, the 
apology for them and the active remorse of the victimizers, presupposing the 
acceptance of the necessary painful collective discussion procedures about the past 
and mainly an attitude of forgiveness on behalf of the victims and amnesty on behalf 
of the state. It tries to record the opposing interpretations, the controversial 
experiences and the self-conflicting interests of a society or two peoples in a post-
traumatic perspective. This type of justice is considered beneficial, to the extent it 
arrives at the legal and historical recognition of the victims’ suffering, for the public 
visibility and re-founding of collective identity, halting the dynamic of grievance, 
vengeance and festering memory inflation.  
 
An example of reparative/restorative justice at an international level is the treaty of 
Versailles, which condemned Germany as “totally guilty” for World War I, that is, 
morally, legally and politically (article 231), and thus forced the country to pay large 
amounts of money to the winners as moral and material compensation.
18
 The 
compensation provided by a consortium of Swiss banks in 1997 to surviving victims 
of the Holocaust or their descendents, can also be considered a type of 
reparative/restorative justice, as it aimed to balance the injustice and reduce the pain 
they suffered by the Nazi who stole their property.
19
 At national level, a first example 
is the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa 
after the abolition of the Apartheid regime (1995), while a second one is the 
recognition and public apology by US high state officials in 1990 for violating the 
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rights of American citizens of Japanese descent, who, during World War II, were held 
in concentration camps, not only for security reasons, as it was claimed, but due to the 
institutional racism of the American state and racial discrimination.
20
 At a bilateral 
level, we have the Luxembourg Agreement signed in 1952, which obliged West 
Germany to recognise its responsibilities, to pay financial compensation to the newly 
founded state of Israel as well as to a Jewish organization representing the victims of 
the Holocaust and their descendents.
21
 Also, the case of the Czech-German 
Declaration on Mutual Relations and their Future Development co-signed by both 
countries in 1997, when Germans apologized for the Nazi crimes, while the Czechs 
admitted their guilt for banishing Sudeten Germans from the country right after the 
end of World War II.   
 
Therefore, the pillars of reparative/restorative justice are two: the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions and secondly, amnesty provision. More specifically, the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, assembled by the state, social or international 
organizations are one of the basic mechanisms for the gradual transition from political 
authoritarianism and civil conflict to parliamentary democracy and the resolution of 
ideological and political tension. Such mechanisms are used when retributive justice 
would have disastrous consequences for the social or political network, or when the 
contradictory interpretations of the recent past could jeopardize the fragile collective 
self-image (Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, South Africa).
22
 In such cases, historical 
truth could become submissive to the reconciliation or occasional political and 
ideological interests, invalidating its definition.
23
 Moreover, the truth and 
reconciliation commissions are usually temporary and transitional. Sometimes, 
however, they transform into permanent institutions. An example of this is the case of 
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Chile, where the truth commission developed into the National Corporation for 
Reparation and Reconciliation, adding to its investigative spectrum new cases of 
human rights violations.
24
 Ideally, these commissions ought to function as a neutral 
and unbiased investigator, agent or judge. Sometimes, prominent academics and 
writers are appointed presidents of the truth and reconciliation commissions, such as 
Ernesto Sabato in Chile. In some occasions, the findings of the rigorous investigation 
carried out by the commissions are publicly presented in celebratory events, in order 
to accredit the whole procedure with solemnity and indisputable status. In Chile, for 
example, these findings were presented in a crowded stadium, by the president of 
country. Such a ratification, apart from the ceremonial and procedural characteristics, 
is equivalent to a formal apology of high state officials and therefore creates the 
conditions not only for collective atonement, re-legalization of power and 
establishment of the institutions’ continuity, but also for dispersing a feeling of 
national consistency and solidarity.
25
   
 
Nowadays, the lion’s share of global concern regarding the necessary types of 
transitional justice is enjoyed by the establishment and function of reconciliation 
commissions.  Starting with those assembled in the Federal Republic of Germany 
during the first post-war years or those created in Argentina and Chile during the 
1980s, the reconciliation commissions have acquired a particular social dynamic in 
both the newly founded democracies resulting from the fall of real socialism, as well 
as in South Africa, in order to make an effort to heal the open traumas of the black 
population caused by the discriminating, excluding and oppressive Apartheid regime. 
The healing could in fact take place by combining the revelation of the truth with the 
public apology and remorse of the victimizers, which ideally should, at least, end up 
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with their victims accepting the apology.  Actually, it is a type of “public theatre”, a 
ceremony that should have led, as ancient Greek tragedy does, to the collective 
catharsis of the suffering, the amnesty of the victimizers and therefore their 
rehabilitation in the collective body, as well as to the repression of the centrifugal 
powers caused by the long-term dissection. 
 
Amnesty is an expression of leniency, especially when it enjoys democratic 
legalization and popular consensus, and it is considered as the most drastic measure of 
healing traumas of the past. In a society where democratic order and legality has been 
restored, amnesty can only conflict with the commitment of crimes against humanity, 
such as mass murders, exterminating population dislocations, torture, asymmetrical 
violence against civilians during war, persecutions for racial, political, ideological, 
cultural or religious reasons.  
 
c) Lastly, transitional justice. This term describes the ways in which “trials, 
amnesties, truth commissions, public apologies, remorse, restoration and other 
relevant policies of managing controversial and traumatic past and of treating/healing 
historical trauma” are or should be used in order to administer justice.26 In this case, 
international, bilateral or national discussion on the past, the approach of historical 
enemies, victimizers and victims, the recognition of the historical injustices and the 
suffering that entire populations or selected groups and individuals were subjected to, 
as well as the catharsis and the symbolic atonement of collective traumas is 
considered a long-term process that can be facilitated either by routing restoration 
policies or by symbolic political actions, such as the one by German Chancellor Willy 
Brandt in 1970 who kneeled in front of the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial, or the French 
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President of the Republic, Jacques Chirac in 1995, who recognised the responsibilities 
of the French state regarding the Vichy regime.
27
  
   
One of the most typical types of transitional justice is the apology of the Catholic 
Church to the Jews, after the suggestions of Pope John XXIII (1958-1963) during the 
Second Vatican Council in 1965. The initiative of Pope John XXIII succeeded the less 
radical and systematic actions of Pope Pius XII concerning the post-war elimination 
of racism and came, to a certain extent, as a result of the strong criticism against the 
passive position of the Catholic Church towards National Socialism and the Holocaust 
cover-up, as well as the aid provided to help Nazi criminals escape.
28
  
 
Conclusions  
Allan Megill points out that in our era, when the past acquires a meaning within the 
field of subjectivity and public history, that is, when it is not ostentatiously ignored, 
then, this meaning becomes a fantastic museum of super-temporal and prescriptive 
ideas, values and ideals, applying either on the cultural heritage and the family 
martyrological genealogy, or on the persistence of memory and commemorative 
rituals.
29
 Especially, when traumatic memory subjugates the scientific approach to the 
past, while including, along with the emotional charge, the moral demand of 
recognizing the suffering and symbolically justifying the victims, nevertheless, it 
poses, at the same time, a high risk for the understanding and interpretation of history 
itself.  So, in conclusion, more issues arise requesting further investigation, such as 
whether it is useful to include civic socialization and intellectual preparation for 
undertaking one’s role as a citizen within the basic aims’ spectrum of history lessons? 
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Or, in other words, how actively should we contemplate on the meaning of historical 
justice within the framework of education?  
 
More specifically, in order to address the issue of education further, one could claim 
that historical justice should be present and effective during the higher classes of 
secondary education, in order to deal with the following: 
a) The relationship between history and justice, which is a central value of Western 
civilization with a generalizing meaning, 
b) The internal distinction between types of justice (while at the same time, it is 
necessary to invoke typical historical examples, which should be included as 
distinctive elements in the analytical syllabus and history school books), 
c) The promotion of the historical charge of concepts such as genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, crimes against humanity, international law, victimizer, victim, memory, 
oblivion, vengeance, memory inflation, amnesia, amnesty, material and moral 
restoration, moral victory, remission, remorse, reconciliation, righteous memory.  
 
The ultimate aim of such an approach is to establish “a memory pedagogy”. That is, 
to establish a pedagogical theory and practice, which would defend morality, but 
without distorting historical reality and without violating the distinctive 
epistemological quality of historical memory and the self-determination of historical 
education.   
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